Chicago, Milw. & St. Paul Ry. CO.
STATE OF MINNESOTA ex rel. RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION. *
March 24, 1890
This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the supreme court of the state of Minnesota, awarding a writ of mandamus against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. The case arose on proceedings taken by the railroad and warehouse commission of the state of Minnesota, under an act of the legislature of that state approved March 7, 1887, (Gen. Laws 1887, c. 10,) entitled 'An act to regulate common carriers, and creating the railroad and warehouse commission of the state of Minnesota, and defining the duties of such commission in relation to common carriers.' The act is set forth in full in the margin. The ninth section of that act creates a commission, to be known as the 'Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota,' to consist of three persons, to be appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate.
On the 22d of June, 1887, the Boards of Trade Union of Farmington, Northfield, Faribault, and Owatonna, in Minnesota, filed with the commission a petition in writing, complaining that the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, being a common carrier engaged in the transportation of property wholly by railroad, for carriage or shipment from Owatonna, Faribault, Dundas, Northfield, and Farmington [134 U.S. 418, 436] to the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, all of those places being within the state of Minnesota, made charges for its services in the transportation of milk from said Owatonna, Faribault, Dundas, Northfield, and Farmington to St. Paul and Minneapolis which were unequal and unreasonable, in that it charged 4 cents per gallon for the transportation of milk from Owatonna to St. Paul and Minneapolis, and 3 cents per gallon from Faribault, Dundas, Northfiled, and Farmington to the said cities; and that such charges were unreasonably high, and subjected the traffic in milk between said points to unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage.
The commission thus informed the company in writing in what respect such tariff or rates and charges was unequal and unreasonable, and recommended to it in writing what tariff should be substituted therefor, to-wit, the tariff so found equal and reasonable by the commission. The company neglected and refused, for more than 10 days after such notice, to substitute or adopt such tariff of charges as was recommended by the commission. The latter [134 U.S. 418, 439] thereupon published the tariff of charges which it had declared to be equal and reasonable, and caused it to be posted at the station of the company in Faribault on the 14tho f October, 1887, and at all the regular stations on the line of the company in Minnesota prior to November 12, 1887, and in all things complied with the statute. The tariff so made, published, and posted was dated October 13, 1887, and was headed: 'Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. (Iowa and Minnesota Division.) Freight tariff on Milk from Owatonna and Faribault to St. Paul and Minneapolis, taking effect October 15, 1887,'-and prescribed a charge of 2 1/2 cents per gallon in 10-gallon cans from either the Owatonna station or the Faribault station to either St. Paul or Minneapolis, to be the legal, equal, and reasonable maximum charge and commpensation for such service, and declared that the same was in force and effect in lieu and place of the charges and compensation theretofore demanded and received therefor by the company.
On the 6th of December, 1887, the commission, by the attorney general of the state, made an application to the supreme court of the state for a writ of mandamus to compel the company to comply with the recommendation made to it by the commission, to change its tariff of rates on milk from Owatonna and Faribault to St. Paul and Minneapolis, and to adopt the rates declared by the commission to be equal and reasonable.
Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the Court.
The construction put upon the statute by the supreme court of Minnesota must be accepted by this court, for the purposes of the present case, as conclusive, and not to be re-examined here as to its propriety or accuracy. The supreme court authoritatively declares that it is the expressed intention of the legislature of Minnesota, by the statute, that the rates recommended and published by the commission, if it proceeds in the manner pointed out by the act, are not simply advisory, nor merely prima facie equal and reasonable, but final and conclusive as to what are equal and reasonable charges; that the law neither contemplates nor allows any issue to be made or inquiry to be had as to their equality or reasonableness in fact; that, under the statute, the rates published by the commission are the only ones that are lawful, and therefore, in contemplation of law, the only ones that are equal and reasonable; and that, in a proceeding for a mandamus under the statute, there is no fact to traverse except the violation of law in not complying with the recommendations of the commission. In other words, although the railroad company is forbidden to establish rates that are not equal and reasonable, there is no power in the courts to stay the hands of the commission, if it chooses to establish rates that are unequal and unreasonable. This being the construction of the statute by which we are bound in considering the present case, we are of opinion that, so construed, it conflicts with the constitution of United States in the particulars complained of by the railroad company. It deprives the company of its right to a judicial investigation, by due process of law, under the forms and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy, and substitutes therefor, as an absolute finality, the action of a railroad commission which, in view of the powers conceded to it by the state court, cannot be regarded as clothed with judicial functions, or possessing the machinery of a court of justice. Under section 8 of the statute, which the supreme court of Minnesota says is the only one which relates to the matter of the fixing by the commission of general schedules of rates, and which section, it says, fully and exclusively provides for that subject, and is complete in itself, all that the commission is required to do is, on the filing with it by a railroad company of copies of its schedules of charges, to 'find' that any part thereof is in any respect unequal or unreasonable, and then it is authorized and directed to compel the company to change the same, and adopt such charge as the commission 'shall declare to be equal and reasonable;' and to that end it is required to inform the company in writing in what respect its charges are unequal and unreasonable. No hearing is provided for; no summons or notice to the company before the commission has found what it is to find, and declared what it is to declare; no opportunity provided for the company to introduce witnesses before the commission,-in fact, nothing which has the semblance of due process of law; and although, in the present case, it appears that, prior to the decision of the commission, the company apeared before it by its agent, and the commission investigated the rates charged by the company for transporting milk, yet it does not appear what the character of the investigation was, or how the result was arrived at. By the second section of the statute in question, it is provided that all charges made by a common carrier for the transportation of passengers or property shall be equal and reasonable. Under this provision, the carrier has a right to make equal and reasonable charges for such transportation. In the present case, the return alleged that the rate of charge fixed by the commission was not equal or reasonable, and the supreme court held that the statute deprived the company of the right to show that judicially. The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving, as it does, the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law, and in violaton of the constitution of the United States; and, in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
BRADLEY, GRAY, and LAMAR, JJ., dissent.
I cannot agree to the decision of the court in this case. It practically overrules Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 , and the several railroad cases that were decided at the same time. The governing principle of those cases was that the regulation and settlement of the fares of railroads and other public accommodations is a legislative prerogative, and not a judicial one. This is a principle which I regard as of great importance. When a railroad company is chartered, it is for the purpose of performing a duty which belongs to the state itself. It is chartered as an agent of the state for furnishing public accommodation. The state might build its railroads, if it saw fit. It is its duty and its prerogative to provide means of intercommunication between one part of its territory and another. And this duty is devolved upon the legislative department. If the legislature commissions private parties, whether corporations or individuals, to perform this duty, it is its prerogative to fix the fares and freights which they may charge for their services.
It is always a delicate thing for the courts to make an issue with the legislative department of the government, and they should never do so if it is possible to avoid it. By the decision now made, we declare, in effect, that the judiciary, and not the legislature, is the final arbiter in the regulation of fares and [134 U.S. 418, 463] freights of railroads, and the charges of other public accommodations. It is an assumption of authority on the part of the judiciary which, it seems to me, with all due deference to the judgment of my brethren it has no right to make. The assertion of jurisdiction by this court makes it the duty of every court of general jurisdiction, state or federal, to entertain complaints against the decisions of the boards of commissioners appointed by the states to regulate their railroads; for all courts are bound by the constitution of the United States, the same as we are. Our jurisdiction is merely appellate. The incongruity of this position will appear more distinctly by a reference to the nature of the cases under consideration. The question presented before the commission in each case was one relating simply to the reasonableness of the rates charged by the companies,-a question of more or less. In the one case the company charged 3 cents per gallon for carrying milk between certain points. The commission deemed this to be unreasonable, and reduced the charge to 2 1/2 cents. In the other case the company charged $1.25 per car for handling and switching empty cars over its lines within the city of Minneapolis, and $1.50 for loaded cars; and the commission decided that $1 per car was a sufficient charge in all cases. The companies complain that the charges as fixed by the commission are unreasonably low, and that they are deprived of their property without due process of law; that they are entitled to a trial by a court and jury, and are not barred by the decisions of a legislative commission. The state court held that the legislature had a right to establish such a commission, and that its determinations are binding and final, and that the courts cannot review them. This court now reverses that decision, and holds the contrary. In my judgment the state court was right; and the establishment of the commission, and its proceedings, were no violation of the constitutional prohibition against depriving persons of their property without due process of law.